AI operating governance · Field note

Average accuracy doesn't tell you what you could lose

TL;DR

Zillow reported a 6.9 percent typical miss across 104 million homes not listed for sale. Its money sat in the homes whose owners said yes. A model's average accuracy does not tell you how it did on the cases you accept.

What the paper develops

In June 2021, Zillow announced a more accurate home-value model: a 6.9 percent median error, the typical miss, across more than 104 million homes not listed for sale. The release said Zillow's growing confidence in the Zestimate's accuracy had led it to start making live cash offers. Less than five months later, Zillow said it would shut the program down. It had bought 9,680 homes in one quarter and written down the value of the homes it held by $304 million.

Zillow's shareholder letter gives other reasons too: price forecasts that missed by more than it had modeled, and more purchases than its renovation and resale capacity could absorb. It also says a larger share of owners accepted its offers than it had seen before, because it was paying more than it later expected the homes to sell for. The letter never mentions the 6.9 percent. That number covered 104 million homes. Zillow's money sat in the homes whose owners said yes.

The people who say yes are not a random sample

Suppose a model prices used vans $1,000 too high or $1,000 too low, half each, so its average error is zero. A company offers the model's price minus $500 and plans to keep the $500 as its margin. The owners know their vans. Owners of vans priced too high say yes, and the rest say no. The company buys the overpriced half and loses $500 on each van, though the average error never changed.

Two studies look at the same pattern. In a simulation of a home buyer in Oslo, expected profit fell from about 6 to 8 percent to about 0 to 1 percent once owners were assumed to accept overpriced offers more readily than underpriced ones. In real purchases by iBuyers, companies that make fast cash offers on homes, profits fell as the companies moved into areas where a standard price model missed more.

Your own approval rule hides errors too. A lender sees how approved loans turn out, but not how refused loans would have turned out. A report built from your own results describes the cases you chose.

Measure the cases you accept

Treat the accepted cases as their own group and track three numbers for it. The acceptance rate against plan is the only one you see before outcomes arrive. Error is how far the estimate was from what happened. Loss is the money actually lost after margin and costs.

Cap what you commit at signing

Outcomes arrive after the commitments, so set the limit when you sign. The leader who would bear the loss sets a cap on the accepted group, in cases or dollars, and writes down the limits for all three numbers before raising it. Raise the cap one step at a time, and lower it or stop when any number leaves its limit.

Ask for the number on the accepted cases

Pick one workflow where a model's estimate sets a commitment that someone else can refuse. Write down who says yes, compare the accepted cases with the declined ones where you can see them, and set the cap and the limits.

Zillow's June release said how accurate the Zestimate was on 104 million homes. It did not say how accurate it was on the homes whose owners said yes. Ask for that number before you sign the next increase. The white paper has the evidence, the sources, and the full method.

What to do next

Treat the cases you accept as their own group. Track the acceptance rate against plan, the error, and the money lost, and raise the cap on what you sign only while all three stay inside limits you set.

WORKFLOWCONTROL EVIDENCEHUMAN OWNER

Inside the white paper

  • Why a model's average error can describe different cases than the ones you accept
  • Three numbers to track for the cases you accept, and why error and loss differ
  • How to cap what you commit at signing and raise the cap in steps

Sources and notes

  1. Zillow Group, "Zillow Starts Making Cash Offers For the Zestimate," press release, February 25, 2021 — Zillow announced that the Zestimate would act as an initial cash offer.
  2. Zillow Group, "Zillow Launches New Neural Zestimate, Yielding Major Accuracy Gains," press release, June 15, 2021 — Zillow reported a 6.9 percent median error and tied its cash offers to confidence in accuracy.
  3. Zillow Group, "Q3 2021 Shareholder Letter," November 2, 2021, filed as Exhibit 99.3 to Form 8-K — Zillow's shareholder letter reports the purchases, the write-down, and its own reasons.
  4. Eirik Helgaker, Are Oust, and Arne J. Pollestad, "Adverse Selection in iBuyer Business Models - Don't Buy Lemons!" Zeitschrift für Immobilienökonomie 9 (2023): 109-138 — Helgaker, Oust, and Pollestad simulate a hypothetical home buyer with and without adverse selection.
  5. Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, and Amit Seru, "Why Is Intermediating Houses So Difficult? Evidence from iBuyers," NBER Working Paper 28252, December 2020, revised June 2025 — Buchak and colleagues study real iBuyer purchases and the role of adverse selection.
  6. Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jon Kleinberg, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig, and Sendhil Mullainathan, "The Selective Labels Problem: Evaluating Algorithmic Predictions in the Presence of Unobservables," Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (2017): 275-284 — Lakkaraju and colleagues show how a decision rule limits which outcomes can be observed.